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The Costs of
Covert Warfare
Airpower, Drugs,
and Warlords in the
Conduct of U.S
Foreign Policy
Alfred W. McCoy
In his address to Congress after the events of September 11, 2001, PresidentGeorge W. Bush told the nation that America’s current war against terrorism
would be like no other our nation had ever fought. On this point Mr. Bush seemed
ill-advised. Our ongoing war in Afghanistan is the logical outcome of a succession
of covert wars that the United States has fought along the mountain rim of Asia
since the end of World War II.
    Looking back on the long history of American intervention in highland Asia,
there are two particularly troubling aspects: first, the rise of a problematic doctrine
of covert warfare; and, second, a contradictory relationship to the global drug trade.
Through four secret wars fought over the span of fifty years, the United States has
developed a covert-warfare doctrine that combines special-operations forces with
airpower. In the thirty years since the end of the Vietnam War, this use of airpower
as a substitute for infantry has placed the United States at increasing variance with
international law in a way that one day risks outright violation. More broadly, the
conduct of foreign policy through covert operations removes these secret wars from
both Congressional oversight and conventional diplomacy, leaving their battle-
grounds black holes of political instability — with profound regional and global
ramifications.
In highland Asia, opium has proven the most sensitive index of such instability.
While these covert wars are being fought, CIA protection transforms tribal warlords
into powerful drug lords linked to international markets. In the wasteland that is the
aftermath of such wars, only opium seems to flower, creating regions and whole
nations with a lasting dependence on the international drug traffic.
Alfred W. McCoy is John R. W. Smail Professor of History at University of Wisconsin,
Madison.
Over the last fifty years the United States has fought four covert wars by using
a unique combination of special operations and airpower as a substitute for
regular ground troops. Such covert wars are removed from Congressional over-
sight and conventional diplomacy. Their battlegrounds become the loci of po-
litical instability. In highland Asia, while these covert wars are being fought,
CIA protection transforms tribal warlords into powerful drug lords linked to
international markets. Arguably, every nation needs an intelligence service to
warn of future dangers. But should this nation have the right, under U.S. or
international law, to conduct its foreign policy through such clandestine opera-
tions?
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Laos in the 1960s
Under its Cold War doctrine of containing communism, the United States, through
its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), fought a succession of secret wars in highland
Asia. In the late 1940s, the Iron Curtain came crashing down across the Asian land-
mass. To contain Soviet and Chinese expansion, the United States mounted covert
operations along communism’s soft underbelly — a highland rim that stretched for
five thousand miles across Asia from Turkey to Thailand.
Along this strategic frontier, geopolitics has produced recurring eruptions at two
flash points — Burma and Laos in the east and Afghanistan in the west. For forty
years, the CIA fought a succession of covert wars at these two points — at Burma
during the 1950s, Laos in the 1960s, and Afghanistan in the 1980s. In one of
history’s accidents, moreover, the Iron Curtain had fallen along Asia’s historic
opium zone, drawing the CIA into ambiguous alliances with the region’s highland
warlords.
In Laos from 1960 to 1974, the United States fought the longest and largest of
these covert wars, discovering new military doctrines that have since become central
to its foreign policy. Since this war was classified then and is, even now, little stud-
ied, most Americans are unaware of the lessons we learned in Laos and their lasting
influence on the later conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
The CIA’s secret war in Laos was an unplanned byproduct of America’s bipartisan
foreign policy during the Cold War. At the start of U.S. intervention in Indochina in
1955, the Eisenhower administration, mindful of the region’s geopolitical impera-
tives, had made Laos its primary bastion against communist infiltration into
Southeast Asia. Unwilling to continue Eisenhower’s Cold War confrontation over
Laos, President Kennedy pulled back by signing a treaty with Moscow in 1962 to
neutralize Laos and relied instead on counterinsurgency inside South Vietnam to
contain communism. In effect, Kennedy withdrew conventional forces from Laos in
favor of his new special warfare doctrine of using American advisers to train the
South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency. In retrospect, Kennedy’s withdrawal from
Laos was a strategic miscalculation.1  When the Vietnam War started two years later
in 1964, there was no longer any restraint on North Vietnamese infiltration through
Laos into South Vietnam. Washington was treaty-bound to respect Laos’s neutrality
and thus found itself in an ambiguous, even contradictory, position — forced to
intervene in a country where it could no longer intervene.2
Ambiguity forced improvisation, leading the United States to develop a new
military doctrine that substituted tribal mercenaries and massive airpower for the
conventional ground forces the United States was now barred from deploying inside
Laos. For more than a decade, the CIA led a secret army of thirty thousand Hmong
mercenaries in covert war against communist guerrillas in the rugged mountains of
northern Laos — a formative lesson for the Agency in the use of tribal warriors.3
Simultaneously, the U.S. Air Force fought the largest air war in military history
over Laos, dropping 2.1 million tons of bombs on this tiny, impoverished nation —
an amount equivalent to that dropped on Germany and Japan by the Allied powers in
all of World War II. Although the bulk of this tonnage was dropped on the Ho Chi
Minh trail in the jungles of southern Laos, the U.S. Air Force still blocked the an-
nual communist offensives on the capital Vientiane by dropping five hundred thou-
sand tons on populated areas surrounding the strategic Plain of Jars in northern
Laos.4
This massive bombardment of northern Laos — over three times the conventional
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tonnage dropped on Japan in World War II — made a wasteland of this narrow,
forty-mile plain and its fifty thousand peasants, bamboo villages, market towns, and
medieval Buddhist temples. “By 1968 the intensity of the bombings was such that no
organized life was possible in the villages,” wrote UN advisor George Chapelier who
interviewed refugees from this air war. “The villages moved . . .deeper and deeper
into the forest as the bombing reached its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily
and destroyed all stationery structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived
in trenches and holes or in caves. They farmed only at night. All of the informants,
without any exception, had his village completely destroyed.”5
In 1971, an American development volunteer working in Laos, Fred Branfman,
interviewed refugees from this air war on the Plain of Jars who expressed a deep
sense of suffering, sadness, and displacement. A 33-year-old woman spoke with
emotion of her experience of peasant life under this secret air war:6
I saw this in the village of my birth, as every day and every night the planes came to
drop bombs on us. We lived in holes to protect our lives . . . I saw my cousin die in the
field of death. My heart was most disturbed and my voice called out loudly as I ran to
the houses. Thus, I saw life and death for the people on account of the war of many
airplanes in the region of Xieng Khouang. Until there were no houses at all. And the
cows and the buffalo were dead. Until everything was leveled and you could see only
the red, red ground. I think of this time and still I am afraid.
While the bombs still rained, some American intellectuals criticized this air war,
branding it a “war crime.” After flying over the Plain of Jars in early 1972, a corre-
spondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, T. D. Allman, termed the bombing
there “an operation that lies well down the spectrum between a military scandal and
a provable war crime.” A group of Cornell University scientists, led by physics
professor Raphael Littauer and astronomer Carl Sagan, reported that U.S. bombing
violated the principle under international law “that a reasonable proportionality exist
between the damage caused and the military gain sought.”7  In his preface to this
report, the Pulitzer Prize–winning New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan concluded:
“The air war may constitute a massive war crime by the American government and
its leaders.”8
At the time, these voices were ignored. Today they have largely been forgotten.
In the real world of the 1970s, there was no international body with the authority,
much less the will, to call the United States to account for these crimes.
By fighting what became history’s largest air war, the Pentagon made an impor-
tant discovery. Through this massive bombing, the U.S. Air Force overturned the
military dictum that only infantry can take and hold ground. Freed from the usual
restraints, the Air Force was able to conduct an ad hoc experiment in aerial bom-
bardment. “When the situation got close to desperate in June [1969] in Laos,” Major
General Robert L. Petit, deputy commander of the 7/13 Air Force, based in Udorn,
Thailand, told the U.S. Congress, “certain restrictions were removed and we were
allowed to use air power in a little freer manner. We also had available at this time
what might be termed a sufficient quantity of air power.”9  In effect, to compensate
for the absence of ground forces, this new strategy required an aerial bombardment
of unprecedented intensity, producing indiscriminate destruction that defied interna-
tional law with regard to proportionality between damage and objective.
Significantly, this air-war strategy gained an additional advantage in the
post-Vietnam era — minimization of American casualties as a military goal. In the
decades since the end of the Vietnam War with its heavy, senseless U.S. casualties,
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the American people have become strongly adverse to even moderate troop losses,
making a new force-projection strategy a domestic political imperative. In this air
war over Laos, the United States had discovered a strategy for intervention without
infantry and their inevitable casualties that has since become central to U.S. foreign
policy in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and, most recently, Afghanistan.
In the quarter century since the Vietnam War, this strategy has placed the United
States at variance with international law that, under Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention, banned indiscriminate military force against a civilian society. U.S.
representatives signed Protocol I to the Geneva Convention in 1977, but a decade
later, President Reagan, under pressure from the Pentagon, recommended that the
Senate reject this treaty.10  In the thirty years since the United States bombed civilian
villages in Laos, Washington has become wedded to an air war strategy that weakens
its leadership in the campaign for an international rule of law.
Of equal importance, in fighting this secret war in Laos from 1960–74, the CIA
supplemented its airpower with a secret army of 30,000 Hmong — tough
highlanders whose only cash crop was opium. Through its reliance upon an ethnic
warlord to mobilize these mercenaries, the Agency became implicated in an opium
trade that sustained the household economy of its tribal allies.
With only one U.S. adviser for every thousand tribal fighters in the mountains of
northern Laos, the Agency lacked the manpower for direct command and instead
relied upon a single warlord, a minor officer named Major Vang Pao, to mobilize
the Hmong villagers for this bloody secret war.11  To prosecute a war that offered the
ordinary Hmong soldier little more than rice and death, the CIA gave its chosen
warlord control over all air transport into the tribal villages scattered across the
mountain tops of northern Laos — both the shipment of rice, the tribe’s main
subsistence commodity, into the villages and the transport of opium, the tribe’s only
cash crop, out to markets in Vientiane and beyond. With a chokehold over the two
economic essentials of every Hmong household after 1965, General Vang Pao, now
commanding both the CIA’s Armée Clandestine and the Royal Lao Army’s Military
Region II, was soon transformed into a powerful warlord. With such control, the
CIA’s Armée Clandestine could impose a central command over this disparate tribe
and extract boy soldiers from remote villages for slaughter in a secret war that was,
for the Hmong, not only endless but hopeless. 12
Since opium thus reinforced the authority of its tribal leaders, pragmatism dic-
tated that the CIA should tolerate the drug traffic. When Hmong officers loaded
opium on the CIA’s helicopters and the commander-in-chief of the Royal Lao Army,
the genial General Ouane Rattikone, opened the world’s largest heroin laboratory,
the Agency was silent. In a secret internal report compiled in 1972, the CIA’s
Inspector General expressed “some concern” that “local officials with whom we are
in contact . . . have been or may be still involved in one way or another in the drug
business. . . . What to do about these people is a particularly troublesome problem,
in view of its implications for some of our operations, particularly in Laos.” The
Inspector identified some problematic military allies whose activities may explain
the reasons for the Agency’s silence: “The past involvement of many of these offic-
ers in drugs is well known, yet their goodwill . . . considerably facilitates the
military activities of Agency-supported irregulars.”13
Instead of trying to restrain drug trafficking by its Laotian assets, the Agency
engaged in concealment and cover-up. When I went to Laos to investigate the drug
trade in 1971, the Lao army’s commander, General Ouane, cordially opened his
opium accounts for examination, but the U.S. Embassy insisted that this same gen-
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eral had never been involved in the drug trade. When I was in a remote highland
village investigating Hmong opium shipments on the Agency’s helicopters, CIA
mercenaries ambushed my research team. Several days later, a CIA operative threat-
ened to murder my Lao interpreter unless I abandoned my investigation. When my
manuscript was in press, Cord Meyer, Jr., the CIA’s director of plans (a synonym for
covert operations), visited my publisher’s offices and insisted, unsuccessfully, that
my book be suppressed.14
The consequences of such complicity detracted from the overall U.S. war effort
in Vietnam. Heroin from these Laotian laboratories was smuggled into South Viet-
nam where, according to a White House survey, 34 percent of U.S. troops were
addicted by 1971.15  If we accept this figure, then there were some eighty thousand
American heroin addicts in South Vietnam, far more than the estimated sixty-eight
thousand addicts back in the United States — and all supplied by America’s covert
warfare allies.16  After U.S. combat forces left Vietnam, Southeast Asian syndicates
followed the troops home and were, by 1974, supplying a quarter of U.S. demand
with Golden Triangle heroin.
In Laos, we can see most clearly the problems involved in the CIA’s use of war-
lords to mobilize tribal armies. Leaders like General Ouane Rattikone exploited the
CIA alliance to become drug lords, expanding opium production and exporting
refined heroin to international markets. Since ruthless drug lords made effective
anti-communist allies and heroin profits amplified their power, CIA agents did not
tamper with the requisites of success in such delicate covert operations.
When the United States withdrew from Laos in 1974, it left behind a covert-
warfare wasteland of the kind that we would see a decade later in Afghanistan.
While the United States ended its conventional war in South Vietnam with a formal
treaty that allowed for resolution of key issues like POWs, Washington quietly
retreated from its covert battleground in Laos without any formal negotiations —
whether for the return of any American POWs or for postwar reconstruction. Statis-
tics can only begin to describe the traumatic impact of this massive covert war upon
an impoverished Laotian society — over two tons of bombs dropped per inhabitant,
an estimated 200,000 dead, some 3,500 villages destroyed inside the former
communist zone, and refugee displacement of some 750,000 people, a quarter of the
population. After a decade of bombing, northern Laos was covered with untold
numbers of anti-personnel bomblets that still, even today, kill and maim hundreds
every year.17
This weakened, traumatized society was captured by a harsh communist regime
that still holds power. Hill farmers continued to grow opium under socialism, and,
during the 1990s, Laos would become the world’s third largest producer.18  But
contained between stable states — China, Vietnam, and Thailand — Laos’s trauma,
in striking contrast to Afghanistan’s a decade later, did not ramify beyond its
borders.
Afghanistan in the 1980s
The CIA’s third covert war along the Asian rim began in 1979, when the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan to save its client regime in Kabul. Seeing an opportunity
to wound its enemy, Washington worked with Pakistan in a ten-year war to drive the
Soviets out of Afghanistan. Instead of fighting this war directly as it had in Laos,
the United States subcontracted much of its covert operations to Pakistan’s Inter-
Service Intelligence, or ISI, which would grow, through this operation, into an
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enormously powerful and problematic force in the region.
When the ISI proposed its Afghan client, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as overall leader
of the anti-Soviet resistance at its start in 1979, Washington — with few alternatives
and less intelligence — agreed. Over the next ten years, the CIA supplied some $2
billion to Afghanistan’s mujahedin through ISI, giving half to Hekmatyar — a
violent fundamentalist warlord who threw acid in the faces of unveiled Afghan
women, murdered rival leaders, and dominated Afghanistan’s heroin trade.19  Once
again, the CIA was mounting a major covert war in the remote highlands of the
Asian opium zone. And, as it had done in Laos, the CIA fought this Afghan war
through a single local commander, making its success synonymous with his power.
Under such circumstances, the CIA had little leverage when its ally decided to
exploit a covert operation to become a drug lord.
Within two years, ISI’s covert supply system for delivering CIA arms to Afghan
rebels had been inverted to move opium from Afghanistan’s guerrilla zones, through
heroin laboratories in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, and then into inter-
national markets. As the mujahedin captured prime agricultural areas inside
Afghanistan during the early 1980s, they pressed their peasant supporters to grow
poppies as a revolutionary tax — raising production tenfold from 250 tons in 1981
to 2,000 tons in 1990.20  Once the mujahedin brought the opium across the border,
they sold it to Pakistani heroin refiners who operated under the protection of ISI’s
General Fazle Huq, governor of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. By 1988,
there were an estimated one hundred to two hundred heroin refineries in the
province’s Khyber district alone.21
Although this region had zero heroin production in the mid 1970s, by 1981 Paki-
stan had become the world’s largest heroin producer. Reporting from Tehran in the
mid 1970s, U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms, the former CIA director, insisted that
there was no heroin production in this region — only a localized opium trade.22  In
1981, by contrast, the U.S. Attorney General, William French Smith, announced
that Pakistan was the source of 60 percent of the illicit American supply. Across
Europe, Afghan-Pakistani heroin captured an even larger share of local markets.23  In
Pakistan itself the number of heroin addicts rose from near zero in 1979 to 5,000 in
1980, 70,000 in 1983 and then, in the words of Pakistan’s own Narcotics Control
Board, went “completely out of hand” to over 1.3 million addicts in 1985.24
At the outset of this operation in 1983, Washington’s implicit choice to sacrifice
the Drug War in order to fight the Cold War was articulated clearly during Congres-
sional hearings over the Reagan administration’s request for $583 million in aid for
Pakistan. In his testimony, Dominick DiCarlo, assistant secretary of state for narcot-
ics, stated that General Fazle Haq, ISI’s warlord of the North West Frontier, was
pursuing opium eradication and warned that pressing our ally further on the issue
would “be disastrous.”25
With seventeen agents and a budget of $20 million between 1985 and 1988, the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) unit in Islamabad did not mount any
serious investigations or participate in any major arrests while the CIA was operating
in the North West Frontier — making the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, in effect, an
enforcement-free zone. Indeed, in 1988, the U.S. Government Accounting Office
reported that “not a single significant international Pakistani trafficker is known to
have been imprisoned prior to 1984,” and those jailed after that date “were quietly
released after serving a few months.”26  In May 1990, as the CIA operation was
ending, the Washington Post broke the media silence on this sensitive subject by
publishing a page-one article, charging that the CIA’s Afghan ally, Hekmatyar, was
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operating heroin laboratories in Pakistan under the protection of ISI.27
The former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Charles Cogan, has since
admitted that his Agency had sacrificed the Drug War to fight the Cold War. “Our
main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets,” Cogan told
Australian television in 1995. “We didn’t really have the resources or the time to
devote to an investigation of the drug trade. I don’t think that we need to apologize
for this. Every situation has its fallout. . . . There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes.
But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.” 28
Since the United States had fought this war in Afghanistan covertly through the
CIA, all the normal diplomatic processes of post war reconstruction were aborted
and the country was simply abandoned. After investing $2 billion in Afghanistan’s
destruction, Washington refused to invest any diplomatic or financial capital in its
reconstruction. In effect, Washington just walked away, leaving Afghanistan deeply
destabilized, with 1.5 million dead, four million refugees, ten million land mines
that killed and wounded 800,000 people, and well-armed tribal warlords primed to
fight for land and power.29
Through this covert war, Pakistan was also destabilized by narco-politics that
corrupted the already weak democratic forces; an intelligence service, the ISI, that
had gained, through its alliance with the CIA and control over the heroin trade,
unprecedented power inside the military; and radical Islamic parties working with
the ISI to fight Pakistan’s continuing covert wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. After
the United States withdrew, Pakistan continued to pursue its long-term goal inside
Afghanistan of installing a Pushtun-dominated client regime in Kabul.
Afghanistan in the 1990s
During the 1990s, the aftermath of this covert war in Afghanistan and the simulta-
neous breakup of the Soviet Union combined to produce a decade of dramatic
changes in Central Asia’s drug traffic. As Afghanistan’s opium production climbed
relentlessly toward a record harvest of 4,600 tons in 1999, this war-ravaged land
became history’s first opium monocrop — that is, the first monocultural nation with
much of its land, capital, water, and labor dedicated to the production of opium.
Although the country was ravaged by war, its concentration of surviving resources
in poppy cultivation was so intense that Afghanistan was soon producing 75 percent
of the world’s heroin.30
These rising heroin exports also financed a bloody civil war inside Afghanistan
and fueled an eruption of ethnic insurgency across a 3,000-mile swath from Central
Asia to the Balkans — in Uzbekistan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Georgia, Kosovo,
and Bosnia. When the United States intervened in Afghanistan again at the end of
this decade, it would find that its long-term goal of rebuilding stability was greatly
complicated by the fallout from its last covert war of the 1980s.
During the 1990s, Afghanistan’s soaring opium harvest fueled an international
smuggling trade that knitted Central Asia, Russia, and Europe into a vast illicit
market of arms, drugs, and money laundering — with drugs moving west toward
Europe, while guns, money, and precursor chemicals headed east across Central
Asia. In this 3,000-mile journey toward Europe by truck, camel, air, and sea,
narcotics swept westward with stunning speed across a dozen boundaries, almost
immune to interdiction or interference.
In 1998, the UN estimated that 42 percent of Afghanistan’s harvest fed European
and other distant markets, but the balance, 58 percent, sustained addicts within the
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region — three million in Iran, another two million in Pakistan, and lesser numbers
in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.31  Between 1990 and 1997, Iran’s opium
seizures along its Afghan border surged from twenty-one to one hundred sixty-two
metric tons, forcing Tehran to close the border in 1998.32
After Iran and Pakistan absorbed the bulk of Afghanistan’s opium harvest, the
balance joined the traffic of some two hundred trucks moving northward daily from
Jalalabad and Kabul toward the Tajikistan frontier — the first stage in a complex
traffic that provided 90 percent of Europe’s heroin supply during the 1990s.33  Once
across the Caspian Sea, Central Asia’s diffuse routes merged as they entered the
Caucasus with its volatile mix of contested boundaries, ethnic insurgency, local
mafias, and criminal clans. From the Caucasus, drug shipments moved around and
across the Black Sea into Turkey; and from there, now as refined heroin, into the
Balkans where rival ethnic militias used drug profits to purchase arms and pay
troops.
During the mid 1990s, within Serbia and its satellite states, the notorious “Arkan”
(Zeljko Raznatovic), one of several narco-nationalists backed by Belgrade’s state
security, used drugs, contraband, and counterfeiting to finance his “Scorpion” gang
that terrorized Kosovo and murdered rival Kosovar drug dealers.34
From Skopje, Pristina, and Tirana, a Kosovar criminal diaspora smuggled heroin
across the Adriatic into Western Europe, where Albanian exiles have, since the early
1990s, used drug profits to purchase Czech and Swiss arms for shipment back to
Kosovo for the separatist guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Even
after the Kumanovo agreement of June 1999 settled the Kosovo conflict, the former
commanders of the KLA, both local clans and aspiring national leaders, continued to
dominate the narcotics traffic through the Balkans to Europe. In Switzerland and the
Czech Republic, Kosovars controlled the local heroin trade, producing notorious
criminals like Princ Dobroshi, one of Europe’s leading traffickers who used his
heroin profits to purchase arms for the KLA until his capture in March 1999.35
Across these vast distances, ad hoc alliances within ethnic diasporas provided the
criminal linkages to move drugs, guns, and cash — Kosovars scattered from Geneva
to Macedonia; Turks from Berlin to Kazakhstan; Armenians from Moscow to
Lebanon; Azerbaijanis from Sumgait to Kyrgyzstan; and Chechens from Baku to
Kazakhstan. In the cities that served as trading posts in this traffic — Osh, Tashkent,
Samarkand, Baku, Tbilissi, Skopje, Pristina, and Tirana — extraordinary profits
from drugs and guns have produced mafia gangs, criminal diasporas, tribal
warlords, and rebel armies.
Wherever this traffic touched ground, the illicit enterprise quickly ramified
through drug production, official corruption, mass addiction, and HIV infection.
The northern routes toward Russia touch ground in Kyrgyzstan where they have
fostered a lethal mix of intravenous injection and HIV infection, with 32 to 49
percent of all addicts in Osh sero-positive by October 2000.36  In releasing the UN’s
annual AIDS review in November 2001, its program director, Dr. Peter Piot, high-
lighted an “explosion” of HIV from Eastern Europe to Central Asia with 250,000
new infections, largely from injected drugs, raising the total of those who are
HIV-positive to over a million.37
During the 1980s, this flood of drug money had transformed Pakistan into a
“narco-state” — corroding already weak democratic institutions and contributing to
the later collapse of the governments under Benazir Bhutto (1988–90) and Nawaz
Sharif (1990–93). Both were funded by drug lords whose unprecedented power
came from a black-market commerce that accounted for some 30 to 50 percent of
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Pakistan’s economy. With profits from its role as the CIA’s intermediary and a
continuing income from the Afghan-Pakistan heroin traffic, Pakistan’s ISI won
increased influence within the military, allowing it the autonomy to continue covert
wars inside Afghanistan and Kashmir in alliance with militant Muslim parties.38
Following the withdrawal of the United States and Soviet Union from
Afghanistan in 1992, Afghan rebels, armed with opium profits, plunged into a
devastating civil war that ravaged an already weakened society. When the indepen-
dent Northern Alliance forces took Kabul in 1992, Pakistan first backed its client
Hekmatyar in two years of shelling and rocketing Kabul that left the capital ruined
and some fifty thousand dead.39  During this period of intensive civil war from 1992
to 1994, ruthless local warlords emerged to combine arms and opium in a brutal
struggle for local power — almost as if the soil had been sown with dragons’ teeth.
When Hekmatyar failed to take power, Pakistan’s ISI armed a new force, the
Taliban, that captured Kabul in September 1996 and then battled the Northern
Alliance, with Pakistan’s support, for control of the valleys beyond. During this
protracted civil war, rival factions used opium to finance the fighting. 40
After growing tenfold during the covert war of the 1980s, Afghanistan’s opium
harvest then doubled again during the civil war of the 1990s, reaching a record
4,600 tons in 1999. 41  During these two decades of warfare, Afghanistan was trans-
formed from a diverse agricultural system — with herding, orchards, and sixty-two
field crops — into the world’s first opium monocrop. With much of its arable land,
labor, water, and capital devoted to opium, the drug trade became the dominant
economic force shaping this nation’s destiny. These twenty years of fighting, in
effect, devastated Afghanistan’s society and ecology. By 1992, fourteen years of
covert and civil warfare had left behind — in a population of some 23 million —
about 1.5 million dead, 4.5 million refugees, a full third of the total population
displaced, and rural subsistence economies “deliberately destroyed.”42
Lying at the northern extremity of the monsoon where the rain clouds are
squeezed dry, Afghanistan is an arid land with a delicate human ecology that could
not recover, unaided, from such unprecedented devastation. When the covert war
started in 1979, the country’s fragile ecosystem was already straining to carry a
heavy population through a delicate balance of annual field crops, orchards, and
herding. In these dry mountains where irrigation relies on snowmelt and droughts
are regular, Afghan societies had long favored tree crops — walnut, pistachio, and
mulberry — since they root deep, resist drought, and serve as famine relief in the
periodic dry years. In the northern Nuristan Valley, for example, one walnut tree
could sustain an adult for a full year. 43  In the early 1970s, a survey of 410 villages
on the Shamali Plain near Kabul found that 91 percent grew wheat and 72 percent
tended mulberry trees. 44  During these two decades of war, however, modern
firepower ravaged the herds and destroyed orchards that would have survived the
traditional warfare of centuries past, crippling this fragile ecology’s capacity for
recovery. Moreover, the Taliban, with an unerring instinct for their society’s
economic jugular, violated the unwritten rules of traditional warfare by destroying
the orchards. In 1999, for example, the Taliban attacked the Northern Alliance’s
mass base by cutting down mulberry and walnut trees across a swath of ethnic-Tajik
areas on the Shamali Plain, destroying life in once-prosperous villages and creating
one hundred thousand refugees. 45
As the strands of postwar devastation wove themselves into a Gordian knot of
social, economic, and ecological suffering, opium became the Alexandrine solution.
Without any aid to rebuild their ravaged herds and orchards after the covert war of
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the 1980s, farmers, including some three million returning refugees, now turned to
opium, a reliable annual crop whose cultivation was already a part of traditional
Afghan agriculture. Since opium required nine times more labor per hectare than the
country’s traditional staple, wheat, poppy cultivation created jobs at a time of high
postwar unemployment. In 1999, opium offered seasonal employment for over a
million Afghans — about a quarter of the potential labor force and possibly half of
those actually employed. 46
In this devastated economy, Afghan opium merchants could accumulate capital
rapidly, which they used to provide poor farmers with crop advances equivalent to
over half their annual income — credit critical to the survival of many poor villag-
ers.47  Finally, in an arid ecosystem with chronic water shortage and periodic
drought, opium had the advantage of needing far less water than food crops such as
wheat. 48
After taking power in 1996, the Taliban’s policies provided stimulus, both direct
and indirect, for a nationwide expansion of opium cultivation, doubling production
to a record 4,600 tons in 1999 — equivalent to 75 percent of the world’s heroin. By
eliminating bandits and capricious warlords who preyed upon the opium trade, the
Taliban brought an order that allowed farmers and traders to work in a relatively
stable regulatory environment.
During their first year in power, the Taliban began collecting a 20 percent tax
from the nation’s opium harvest, both opium farmers and heroin refiners, earning
revenues estimated variously at $20 to $100 million. Farmers saw the regime’s
agricultural tax as implicit support for the opium trade and felt encouraged to
expand cultivation.49  As their commanders occupied the countryside, the Taliban
soon controlled 97 percent of Afghanistan’s opium. In some prime agricultural
districts, particularly in Nangarhar Province, farmers began planting up to 60
percent of their arable land to opium.50
In retrospect, however, the Taliban’s most important contribution to the illicit
traffic was its support for the introduction of large-scale heroin refining. As Pakistan
responded to American pressure by eradicating poppy cultivation and closing heroin
refineries during the mid 1990s, heroin production moved westward across the
border from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Jalalabad, capital of Afghanistan’s opium-rich
Nangarhar Province. There the Taliban protected hundreds of heroin labs clustered
around the city in exchange for a modest production tax of $70 per kilogram of
heroin. 51
Through their field surveys, UN researchers found that the Taliban presided over
regional opium markets and a well-ordered drug export industry. Lying at the heart
of the Helmand irrigation district, source of half of Afghanistan’s opium harvest,
Sangin’s “free market” bazaar had some two hundred traders who specialized in the
export of smoking-opium west across the desert into Iran. At the Ghani Kel bazaar
in eastern Nangarhar Province, producer of a quarter of the country’s opium, the
trade was centralized under forty merchants who worked through Pushtun tribal
connections to export heroin and morphine eastward into Pakistan. 52
Significantly, the Taliban regime’s ban on the employment and education of
women created a vast pool of low-cost labor to sustain this accelerated expansion of
opium production. In northern and eastern Afghanistan, women of all ages played,
the UN found, “a fundamental role in the cultivation of the opium poppy”—
planting, weeding, harvesting, cooking for laborers, and processing by-products
such as oil.53
During the Taliban’s first years in power, its leader Mullah Omar made periodic
233
offers to both the UN and United States to swap an opium ban for international
recognition — overtures that gave the UN Drug Control Program access to
Afghanistan for a failed attempt at opium eradication.54  Although the Taliban prom-
ised a one-third reduction in cultivation, donors, including the United States, were
unconvinced and provided only half the $16.4 million that the UN had requested. 55
In May 1999, Kabul’s Anti-Narcotics Department finally announced a modest eradi-
cation effort in three districts of Kandahar, destroying only 325 hectares in a region
with 5,602 hectares planted to poppy.56  In sum, during the late 1990s, the Taliban’s
theocracy introduced policies that, by design and default, lent state support to
developing the world’s first opium monocrop.
Afghanistan After 9/11
 In July 2000, as drought brought mass starvation to Afghanistan, the Taliban sud-
denly ordered a total ban on all opium cultivation in a desperate bid for international
recognition and support. With the drought reducing yields, the recently completed
harvest was already down sharply to 3,276 tons of opium from the 1999 record of
4,600 tons. But Afghan farmers usually hoard up to 60 percent of their harvest, so
the country still had massive stockpiles to cushion the blow.57
Three months later, in an apparent bid for the Afghan seat in the General Assem-
bly, the Taliban sent a delegation to UN headquarters in New York, where its Deputy
Foreign Minister Abdur Rahman Zahid denounced the Northern Alliance govern-
ment as a “band of thugs” who controlled the country’s heroin traffic.58  Though the
UN ignored the Taliban delegation, crop surveys confirmed that the regime had
indeed eradicated 99 percent of the opium in its territories. The CIA reported that
Afghanistan’s opium production had dropped from 4,042 tons in 2000 to 82 tons in
2001.59
A UN survey of 10,030 villages found that the Taliban, by enforcing its ban with
mass arrests, had cut Afghanistan’s opium harvest to only 185 metric tons in 2001
— a 94 percent reduction that virtually eliminated opium in two of the country’s
three main opium districts. In the Taliban’s two main opium districts, Helmand and
Nangarhar, the reduction was over 99 percent. But in Northern Alliance areas, poppy
planting more than doubled, making this opposition coalition the country’s top drug
lords with over 80 percent of Afghanistan’s opium production and much of its
heroin smuggling. 60
In eradicating opium, the Taliban had destroyed the country’s only surviving
industry. By the time the Taliban banned opium in July 2000, Afghanistan had, by
design and default, become dependent on poppy production for most of its taxes, all
export income, and much of its employment. In this context, the Taliban’s edict was
an act of economic suicide that brought an already weakened society to the brink of
collapse.
When the massive U.S. bombing campaign began in October 2001, a year after
the opium ban, the Taliban regime collapsed with a speed that R. W. Apple of the
New York Times called “so sudden and so unexpected that government officials and
commentators on strategy . . . are finding it hard to explain.”61  Though the U.S.
bombing did enormous damage, its role may have been catalytic, not causal —
accelerating an ongoing internal collapse that might have eventually swept the
Taliban from power without any foreign intervention. I would argue that the
Taliban’s economic evisceration left their theocracy a hollow shell of military force
that shattered with the first American bombs.
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The start of war with the United States in September 2001 ended the Taliban’s
opium ban. At the start of fall planting in early September, the Taliban announced
an end to the opium prohibition over its Voice of Shariat radio, and UN observers
soon saw peasants preparing poppy fields in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, the
regime’s heartland. Only days after the U.S. started military operations, local traders
dumped their stockpiles on the market, sending opium prices down by 500 percent
and filling gaps in global supply.62
As the Taliban collapsed in mid November, this dragons’ teeth soil suddenly
raised a new crop of warlords who used their drug money to arm fighters and seize
territory. Using the covert-warfare doctrine first seen in Laos, Washington had
deployed massive airpower and Special Forces as advisers to Afghan warlords —
providing arms and money that reinvigorated local commanders after four tough
years under the Taliban.
Across the country, the brutal warlords, eclipsed by the Taliban victory in 1996,
re-emerged to fight for territory, seize food shipments, and smuggle drugs. Along
the country’s northern tier, the CIA delivered bundles of unmarked U.S. bills to
mobilize Northern Alliance warlords, long active in the local drug trade, for attacks
on Kabul and other key cities. In the southeast, the Agency delivered money to
Pushtun warlords, who dominated drug smuggling on the Pakistan border, to drive
the Taliban out of their spiritual heartland. By the time the Taliban forces were in
full flight, the CIA had distributed, through its agents and Special Operations forces,
$70 million in “direct cash outlays on the ground in Afghanistan,” an expense that
President Bush called one of history’s biggest “bargains.” But this was a bargain
with a high hidden cost. After Taliban rule collapsed suddenly in November 2001,
these same “corrupt and brutal” warlords quickly filled the political void by moving
into towns and cities with thousands of militia armed from their arsenals, creating
conditions ideal for the resumption of heroin trafficking.63  In the northeast, the
Northern Alliance’s local commanders, who had long dominated drug smuggling
into Tajikistan, expanded their territorial control. In the Pushtun-dominated
southeast, former warlords, long active in the heroin trade with Pakistan, suddenly
reappeared to seize local power.
Under the interim Eastern Shura government at Jalalabad, for example, the
Pushtun warlord Hazarat Ali, notorious for opium smuggling when he ran the
airport in the early 1990s, used his wealth to arm six thousand militia and capture
the city, a center for heroin refining. In this same region, the overall warlord, Abdul
Qadir, took control of Nangarhar Province where, in the early 1990s, he had once
supervised over a rapid growth in opium production. Within weeks, the Eastern
Shura’s senior drug control official reported a burst of poppy planting in the
heroin-heartland of Nangarhar Province.64
Further south in Kandahar, Gul Agha Shirzai, the pre-Taliban governor of the
province, returned to power at the head of three thousand fighters after seven years
on the Pakistan border engaged in what the New York Times called, with wry wit,
“getting rich through commerce of a sometimes murky nature.” 65  Thus, only weeks
after the Taliban’s fall, all of Afghanistan’s key opium-producing regions —
Helmand, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan — were again under the control of powerful
drug lords.
Only days before the international donors conference at Tokyo in January 2002,
interim Prime Minister Karzai issued a pro-forma ban on opium growing and heroin
processing without any means to enforce it against the power of local warlords.66
Indeed, in October the UN reported, from its field surveys, that the country’s 2002
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opium harvest had surged from 185 tons the year before to 3,400 tons — again the
world’s highest and the same level that it had been before theTaliban’s poppy ban.
Significantly, the UN estimated the value of this opium harvest, most of it under the
control of local warlords, at $1.2 billion — an amount greater than foreign aid
actually delivered to the Karzai regime in Kabul and an economic imbalance that
helps explain both the political survival of these brutal commanders and the weak-
ness of the central government.67  In 2003, this pattern was, according to the UN,
repeated with opium production rising to 3,600 tons and illicit drugs providing some
$2.3 billion for Afghanistan, more than double foreign aid and nearly half the
country’s economic activity.68 Once again, Afghanistan was in the grip of the war-
lords and its land given over to opium, arms, and warfare.
Conclusion
Looking back on these covert wars, I would argue that their unseen costs, once
recognized and calculated, might be considered unacceptably high. During the Cold
War, CIA agents allied with Asian warlords to wage covert wars that served as
catalysts for the region’s opium traffic at several critical points in its postwar
history.
In mountain ranges along the southern rim of Asia — whether in Afghanistan,
Burma, or Laos — opium was a key element in the apparatus of local power. Once
allied with the CIA, these warlords used the Agency’s protection to expand local
opium production and become powerful drug lords. Focused on their covert mis-
sion, the CIA operatives usually ignored drug dealing by their assets. Once the CIA
allied itself with one of these opium warlords, it could not afford to compromise an
important covert-action asset with drug charges.
Respecting the national security imperatives of these covert operations, the DEA
kept its distance from Agency assets, whether in Afghanistan or Laos. Such implicit
tolerance allowed covert-war battlefields to become enforcement-free areas where
the opium trafficking could expand without restraint.
From a narrow Cold War perspective, such informal tolerance of drug dealing
often amplified the CIA’s operational effectiveness. As tribal societies mobilized to
fight the CIA’s secret wars, they diverted critical manpower from subsistence
agriculture to combat. In effect, this diversion of labor from subsistence crops was
covered by a rapid increase in cash-crop drug sales. From the CIA’s viewpoint,
narcotics income thus spared the Agency the prohibitive cost of providing welfare
for tribes with dependents numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Of equal impor-
tance, control over this cash crop allowed the CIA’s chosen warlords to command
tribes, clans, and villages in bloody campaigns that ground on for a decade or more.
In sum, through its tolerance of the opium trade, the CIA’s expenses declined and its
operational effectiveness increased.
Looking back on these CIA covert campaigns, there is a striking contrast between
their short-term military gains and their long-term diplomatic costs. During each
operation and its aftermath, there is a sharp rise in both opium production and
heroin exports to international markets, including Europe and America.
Once the operation is over, both the market linkages and warlord power remain to
make these regions major drug suppliers for decades to come. Of equal importance,
the peculiar character of covert warfare denies its battlegrounds the elements of
postwar reconstruction that often follows conventional combat. Since these secret
wars are fought outside the normal diplomatic channels, their postwar rehabilitation
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remains beyond the realm of conventional international intercourse.
Even when covert warfare is followed by foreign aid, as it has been in Afghani-
stan since 2002, the costs of CIA covert warfare are still high. During the fighting,
the combination of U.S. airpower and CIA alliances with Afghan warlords was, in a
sense, the ultimate test of the new warfare doctrine developed in Laos thirty years
before. In the short term, this strategic doctrine proved surprisingly successful in
defeating the Taliban regime with just a few Special Operations forces and almost
no American casualties. But this manipulation of Afghan society to advance the
warlords, a tactic central to this covert warfare doctrine, left these corrupt
commanders in control of the countryside once the fighting was over, creating a
lasting source of conflict for both Afghanistan and Central Asia. Once again, CIA
covert warfare, so successful in the short term, has left behind an ambiguous
political legacy that may, yet again, make Afghanistan a source of regional and
international instability.
In the absence of international aid, these highland societies often expand their
opiate production as an ad hoc form of postwar reconstruction. Over time, narcotics
serve not only to sustain a traumatized society during its postwar recovery, but also
to reinforce its isolation from legitimate resources of the international community.
After CIA intervention in the 1950s, Burma’s opium production rose from eighteen
tons in 1958 to six hundred tons in 1970. During the CIA’s covert war of the 1980s,
Afghanistan’s harvest increased from an estimated one hundred tons in 1971 to two
thousand tons in 1991 and then kept rising to 4,600 tons in the war’s aftermath.69  A
decade after the Cold War’s end, the CIA’s three covert battlegrounds along the
5,000-mile span of the Asian opium zone — Afghanistan, Burma, and Laos — were,
in that order, the world’s three leading opium producers. Though small and remote,
these covert-war wastelands can become significant sources of international instabil-
ity — veritable wounds on the international body politic.
This history of covert warfare also raises some important questions about the
CIA’s future role in U.S. foreign policy. At the broadest level, this review of covert
operations indicates some of the hidden political costs of investing an executive
agency with extraordinary powers — a problem that American society has refused to
address, in the aftermath of the Cold War, in a serious, sustained manner.
As the winner of the Cold War, the United States has been spared any painful
self-examination, any need to question the methods used or price paid for victory.
Alone among the major covert agencies that fought the Cold War, only the CIA
survives unreformed, its files still sealed, its failings unexamined. Not only has the
CIA survived, but it has parlayed its claims of victory over communism, and now
terrorism, to win massive budget increases that make it one of the most powerful of
federal agencies.
On its fiftieth anniversary in November 1997, the CIA looked into a future with-
out communism and proclaimed its new missions as the fight against terrorism and
international crime, particularly drug trafficking. As President Clinton put it, the
Agency would be charged with “protecting American citizens from new
transnational threats such as drug traffickers, terrorists, organized criminals, and
weapons of mass destruction.”70
As an intelligence, espionage, and covert-action agency, the CIA has developed
an ingrained institutional culture of operating outside the law. Unless we are to
adopt President Nixon’s option of wholesale assassination of drug lords, the CIA is
ill-equipped for the fight against crime.71 Unlike the FBI or DEA, the CIA simply
does not have the experience to collect evidence within the law in ways that will
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allow successful criminal prosecutions.
The time may have come to put aside the comfortable self-assurance from our
victories in the Cold War and the War on Terror and begin asking some hard
questions about the CIA’s future. Now that the Cold War is over, do we really need a
CIA armed with the extraordinary powers that place it beyond the law? If so, do we
want the CIA to fight the Drug War and the War on Terror with the same covert-
action arsenal it used in the Cold War? Do we want the CIA to preserve its Cold War
powers to conduct covert operations exempt from both legal restraint and legislative
oversight?
As we saw in the 1980s and are seeing again in Afghanistan, the CIA’s alliances
with warlords cum drug lords were not just an aberration, not just an expedient born
of the Cold War. To mount complex covert operations in remote foreign territories,
CIA agents often seem to require the services of criminal assets skilled in what CIA
agent Lucien Conein once called “the clandestine arts”— that unique capacity,
shared by spies and criminals, to conduct vast enterprises and major operations out-
side the bounds of civil society.72
Simply put, the CIA’s liaisons with warlords, drug lords, and criminals are an
integral part of its covert operational capacity. Now, more than a decade after the
end of the Cold War, it seems that we are faced with some choices. We can either
deny the U.S. executive the authority to conduct these extra-legal covert operations,
or we can accept that these missions may well involve the CIA in criminal alliances
and leave behind covert-warfare wastelands of the kind we have seen in Laos and
Afghanistan.
Arguably, every nation needs an intelligence service to warn of future dangers.
But should this nation have the right, under U.S. or international law, to conduct its
foreign policy through clandestine operations involving bribes, black propaganda,
murder, torture, criminal alliances, and covert warfare? The time may have come to
put aside the complacency from our victories in the Cold War and the War on Terror
and ask some hard questions about both the long-term costs of covert warfare and
the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy. z
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